In the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc. vs State Of Punjab on 9 April, 1980, the Supreme Court of India was faced with a significant question regarding the scope and application of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which pertains to anticipatory bail. The case was presided over by a bench that included Y.V. Chandrachud (CJ), P.N. Bhagwati, N.L. Untwalia, R.S. Pathak, and O. Chinnappa (J).
Facts of the Case
The appellant, Sri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, was a Minister of Irrigation and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab. Serious allegations of political corruption were leveled against him and others, leading to applications being filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The applications requested that the appellants be released on bail, should they be arrested on the aforementioned charges. A single judge, considering the importance of the matter, referred the applications to a Full Bench.
Issues Raised
The Full Bench dismissed the applications, summarizing the legal position of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The bench outlined eight points, including the extraordinary nature of the power under Section 438, the limitations imposed by Section 437, the need for a special case for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail, and the inability to exercise discretion for offences punishable with death or life imprisonment unless the charge appears false or groundless. The bench also noted that in serious cases like economic offences involving blatant corruption at higher levels of executive and political power, the discretion under Section 438 should not be exercised.
The appellants contended that the power conferred by Section 438 to grant anticipatory bail is not limited to the contingencies summarized by the High Court. They argued that the power to grant anticipatory bail should be left to the discretion of the court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. They also argued that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, courts should lean against imposing unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438.
Court’s Observations and Ruling
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in part. The court emphasized that personal liberty and the investigational powers of the police are both vital interests of society. The court’s task was to balance these interests while determining the scope of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The court held that the High Court and the Court of Session should exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion. The court also clarified that the filing of a First Information Report (FIR) is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The court further noted that anticipatory bail can be granted even after an FIR is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
The court also held that a “blanket order” of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. The court stated that an order of anticipatory bail constitutes an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for the offence or offences in respect of which the order is issued.
The court concluded that the High Court and the Court of Session should be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit to do so on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and on such conditions as the case may warrant. Similarly, they must be left free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant, on considerations similar to those mentioned in Section 437 or which are generally considered to be relevant under Section 439 of the Code.