Delhi High Court
Deepika Chaudhary vs University Of Delhi on 25 September, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996VAD(DELHI)148, 64(1996)DLT503, 2003(39)DRJ491
JUDGMENT
C.M. Nayar, J.
(1) The present petition is directed against respondents 1 to 3 to declare the result of the petitioner for the Examination of M.A.(Pol. Science) held in April/May, 1996 and for direction to respondents 4 and 5 to extend the time and not to cancel her candidature for M.Phil Course for which the petitioner has been duly admitted.
(2) The Jawahar Lal Nehru University (for short JNU) invited applications for admission to M.Phil Course for which the petitioner applied (3) Notice to show cause was issued on August 16, 1996. The reply has since been filed on behalf of Jnu by acting Registrar Shri K.Kishore. No reply was necessary by University of Delhi, respondents 1,2 and 3 as the result of the petitioner has since been declared on August 21, 1996. The stand taken by respondent 4 and 5 is that the petitioner has not been given any admission so far, therefore, the question of cancellation of the same does not arise. The deposit of first instalment of fees does not give automatic admission to the candidate and it is only one of the formalities to be observed by the candidate before admission is granted.
(4) Reference is made to the Brochure which contains detailed instructions to the candidates seeking admission. The same as quoted in the affidavit reads as follows: “SELECTED candidates will be required to complete admission formalities within the specific deadlines indicated in their offer of admission letter. Candidates who have completed admission formalities, as given below, will only be eligible for registration of courses as per time table for. registration for various programes Schools Disciplines of studies.”
(5) It is next contended that the University offers admission ordinarily upto July 31 each year and the admission is open maximum upto 14th August of the said year with the late fee. If the candidate fails to submit original certificate of his qualifying examination by 14th August then he is not entitled to admission. At best he is entitled to admission in the next semester/academic year without undergoing the entrance test. The detailed reference to the relevant Rule is made in paragraph “E’ of the reply affidavit which reads as follows: “E.The Rules pertaining to admission are a matter of internal management and with respect it is submitted that a Statutory Body is bound to act in accordance with the said Rules without any favour to any body. The Rule in this behalf is as follows : The last date of registration in the case of fresh entrants is July 31, 1996. However, those of fresh entrants whose results of the qualifying examination by the previous Board/Universities are not declared by July 31, 1996 are allowed (with prior permission on a written request) to complete registration formalities latest by August 14, 1996. No registration will be permitted after August 14, 1996 under any circumstances and no correspondence will be entertained in this context. Candidates who are not able to report for registration along with all relevant original documents including marks sheets etc. by August 14, 1996, either due to late declaration of results of their qualifying examination or due to other reasons, are advised, in their own interest not to come for joining the University after the above noted dead line.”
(6) The learned counsel on the basis of the above rule contends that in no case the petitioner can be admitted as she has failed to furnish her result marks sheet by August 14, 1996 of her result in M.A.(Pol. Science) Examination. He has further argued that there are 130 Universities all over India and each University declares the result at different times and in case the respondent University is to await for the results of all the said universities for admission to students, it may not be possible for this University to finalise its admission and start the educational curriculum.
(7) Reference is made to the judgments as reported in Suman Gupta and others v. State of J & K and others ; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kurmarsheth, etc. ; State of Bihar and others v. Dr.Sanjay Kumar Sinha and others ; Jawaharlal Nehru University and another v. Maj. General Y.M.Bammi and another and SaNgeeta Sharma v. University of Delhi & others 57(1994) Delhi Law Times 80.
(8) In Suman Gupta and others (supra) the learned counsel has relied on paragraph 7 which reiterates that the selection of an appropriate procedure lies ordinarily within the domain of administrative policy, and when the objective can be fulfillled by more than one constitutionally valid method, the selection must be left to administrative choice. Therefore, it is argued that the criteria as evolved by the University in the present case for fixing the last date for submission of documents cannot be interfered as it is within their domain and the Court is not empowered to formulate its own criteria. This judgment cannot be of any assistance as it does not deal with the situation as has arisen in the present case when there is only a few days delay in submission of the marks sheet by the petitioner and the same cannot be attributed to her negligence.
(9) Similarly, the judgment as reported in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another (supra) is cited to reiterate the proposition that it is not open for this Court to strike down a bye-law on the ground of unreasonableness merely because the Court does not approve of it. Paragraph 21 of this judgment reads as follows:
“21.The legal position is now well established that even a bye-law cannot be struck down by the Court on the ground of unreasonableness merely because the Court thinks that it goes further than “is necessary” or that it does not incorporate certain provisions which, in the opinion of the court, would have been fair and wholesome. The Court cannot say that a bye-law is unreasonable merely because the Judges do not approve of it. Unless it can be said that a bye-law is manifestly unjust, capricious, inequitable, or partial in its operation, it cannot be invalidated by the Court on the ground of unreasonableness. The responsible representative body entrusted with the power to make bye-laws must ordinarily be presumed to know what is necessary, reasonable, just and fair. In this connection we may usefully extract the following oft-quoted observations of Lord Russell of Killowen in Kruse v. Johnson, . “When the Court is called upon to consider the bye-laws of public representative bodies clothed with the ample authority which I have described, accompanied by checks and safeguards which I have mentioned. I think the consideration of such bye-laws ought to be approached from a different standpoint. They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be, as has been said, ‘benevolently interpreted’ and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably administered.”
“THE learned Chief Justice said further that there may be “cases in which it would be the duty of the court to condemn by-laws made under such authority as these were made (by a county council) as invalid because unreasonable. But unreasonable in what sense? If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as’ between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or, gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the court might well say, ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.’ But it is in this and this sense only, as I conceive, that the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness can properly be regarded. A bye-law is not unreasonable merely because particular judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient or because it is not accompanied by an exception which some judges may think ought to be there’.” We may also refer with advantage to the wellknown decision of the Privy Council in Slattery v. Naylor (1888) 13 A C 446, where it has been laid down that when considering whether a bye-law is reasonable or not, the Court would need a strong case to be made against it and would decline to determine whether it would have been wiser or more prudent to make the byelaw less absolute or will it hold the bye- law to be unreasonable because considerations which the court would itself have regarded in framing such a bye-law have been overlooked or rejected by its framers. The principles laid down as aforesaid in Kruse V. Johnson and Slattery v. Naylor have been cited with approval and applied by this Court in Trustees of the Port of Madras v. Aminchand Pyarelal .”
(10) In State of Bihar and others the Supreme Court took serious view of the matter when the frame set up by that Court was not strictly followed for Postgraduate medical courses. This judgment, therefore, cannot be of any assistance to the contentions as raised on behalf of the University (JNU).
(11) In Jawaharlal Nehru University and another (supra) the question which arose before the Court was as to whether the decision of Academic Council rendering examination of a candidate as invalid and withholding of results could be interfered with. The Court returned to the following findings as referred to in paragraph 7 of the judgment, which reads as follows: “IT appears to us that the stand taken by the Academic Council was supportable on basis of the rules guiding the matter. The Rules required that for a satisfactory completion of a semester, the sessional requirements and the examination should relate to the same semester and any deviation therefrom would introduce desperate and non- comparable parameters in evaluation. This is purely an academic perception in which the judicial role is obviously limited. We are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the High Court in the matter. In our opinion, the Academic Council could not be faulted in its insistence on following the procedure and in declining to create an exception in the case of a particular candidate. It is such departures from strict adherence to the rules that expose the academic system to disrespect and discredit.”
(12) The facts in the present case are of no comparison to the facts which arose in the case as cited above as in that case the powers exercised by the Academic Council in accepting the Rules and not making any exception in the case of a particular candidate could not be faulted.
(13) The judgment in Sangeeta Sharma (supra) also does not support the contentions of the petitioner as it was held in the facts arising therein that the Admission Committee was competent to take decisions to announce the result on a particular date and the failure of the candidate to submit eligibility-cum-option form entailed forfeiture of right to admission. The Court, however, granted relief on the basis of re-consideration of the matter by the Admission Committee and the available seats were offered to some of the candidates.
(14) The learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has contended that the petitioner had complied with all formalities for admission to the Course. The result/marks sheet of her M.A.(Pol. Science) Examination could not be submitted till August 14, 1996, the date prescribed by the University of respondents 4 and 5 as the University of Delhi failed to intimate or announce her result which was only announced on August 21, 1996. The petitioner, accordingly could not be penalised as the declaration of the result was not due to the fault of the-petitioner. The respondent University (JNU) cannot be permitted to follow a rigid approach by depriving the petitioner of a seat for the course she has been admitted on merit. Reliance is first placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in In re Presidential Election, 1974 Air 1974 Supreme Court 1682 which Wm rendered on different facts. However, it is relevant to reiterate what has been stated therein that the law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. Paragraph 15 may be reproduced as follows : “15.The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President Before the expiration of the term of the office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legem is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legem is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him”. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (see Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edition at pp. 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Ed. at p. 268).”
(15) In Ashok Chand Singhvi v. University of Jodhpur and others , the Supreme Court upheld the contention that assuming that the student was admitted through mistake, he not being at fault, the subsequent order withholding the admission was not liable to be sustained. In the present case, the rejection of the petitioner on the mere ground that she could not communicate her result by August 14, 1996 cannot be sustained as she was not to be blamed for this delay on the part of the University of. Delhi.
(16) The petitioner was duly successful in the admission test and was admitted for the course and part of the fee was accepted from her. The only ground of her rejection at a subsequent stage is that she failed to furnish her result/ marks sheet for M.A.(Pol. Science) Examination. The said result was obviously not declared by the University of Delhi over which the petitioner exercised no control. Therefore, it was not on account of her lapse that the necessary result could not be communicated within the stipulated period. In this background, respondents 4 and 5 should have permitted the petitioner to continue her course and not maintained a strict posture in following the prescribed regulation fixing the last date as 14th August, 1996 in a rigid manner. The University has to consider the welfare of the student and the impact of cancellation for non-compliance of one of the conditions for admissions, when fees have already been paid and no fault could be attributed to the petitioner. Surely this discretion can be easily exercised by even the statutory body which is empowered to consider each case on its own merits. The provision has to be benevolently interpreted and reasonably administered. This will not in any manner amount to disrespect and discredit to the Academic Council.
(17) For the afore going reason, this petition deserves to be allowed. The order cancelling the petitioner’s admission to M.Phil is quashed and she shall be permitted to continue her study in the University (JNU) unhampered and interrupted