In the case of Ajay Kumar Parmar vs State Of Rajasthan on 27 September, 2012, the Supreme Court of India was faced with an appeal against the judgment and order dated 9.1.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur. The High Court had upheld the judgment and order dated 25.7.1998, passed by the Sessions Judge in Revision Petition No. 5 of 1998, which had reversed the order of discharge of the appellant for the offences under Sections 376 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) dated 25.3.1998, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj.
Facts of the Case
The case arose from an FIR lodged by one Pushpa on 22.3.1997, against the appellant stating that the appellant had raped her on 10.3.1997. The appellant was medically examined and the prosecutrix’s clothes were recovered and sent for the preparation of an FSL report. The prosecutrix was also medically examined on 22.3.1997, and it was opined by the doctor that she was habitual to sexual intercourse, however, a final opinion regarding fresh intercourse would be given only after receipt of report from the Chemical Examiner.
Issues in the Case
The main issue in the case was whether the Magistrate was right in discharging the appellant based on the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), which stated that the FIR lodged by her was false and that no offence was ever committed by the appellant. The public prosecutor filed a revision before the Learned Sessions Judge, Sirohi, wherein, the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1998 was reversed on the grounds that a case under Sections 376 and 342 IPC was triable by the Sessions Court and the Magistrate, therefore, had no jurisdiction to discharge/acquit the appellant. The High Court affirmed the order of the Sessions Court.
Court’s Observations
The Supreme Court observed that the Magistrate had no business to discharge the appellant. The court was of the considered opinion that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to probe or look into the matter at all. His concern should be to see what provisions of the Penal statute have been mentioned and in case an offence triable by the Sessions Court has been mentioned, he must commit the case to the Sessions Court and do nothing else. The court also observed that the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., loses its significance and legal sanctity as there was no identification of the prosecutrix, either by the said advocate or by anyone else. The court also noted that the signatures on the FIR and Medical Report did not match with the signatures on the application filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi, for recording her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
Further Observations and Legal Principles
The Supreme Court also made significant observations on the role of the Magistrate and the process of recording statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The court held that a person should be produced before a Magistrate by the police for recording his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The court also held that when an offence is cognizable by the Sessions court, the Magistrate cannot probe into the matter and discharge the accused. It is not permissible for him to do so, even after considering the evidence on record, as he has no jurisdiction to probe or look into the matter at all.
The court also discussed the issue of comparison of signatures and handwriting. The court held that there is no legal bar to prevent the Court from comparing signatures or handwriting, by using its own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing and then from applying its own observation to prove the said handwritings to be the same or different, as the case may be. However, the court also cautioned that the opinion formed by the Court may not be conclusive and is susceptible to error, especially when the exercise is conducted by one, not conversant with the subject.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the Magistrate had acted in violation of the mandatory requirement of law by not giving any notice to the complainant before dropping the proceedings. The court also held that the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., loses its significance and legal sanctity as there was no identification of the prosecutrix. The court also found that the signatures on the FIR and Medical Report did not match with the signatures on the application filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi, for recording her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The court held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to discharge the appellant and that he was bound under law to commit the case to the Sessions Court, where such application for discharge would be considered. The order of discharge was therefore, a nullity, being without jurisdiction.