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Bombay High CourtIndian Cases

Bharatkumar S/O Shrimannarayan … vs Anita Trust Through Ku. Priti D/O … on 20 August 2002

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Bombay High Court
Bharatkumar S/O Shrimannarayan … vs Anita Trust, Through Ku. Priti D/O … on 20 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(1)BOMCR230, 2002(4)MHLJ597
Author: V.G. Palshikar
Bench: V.G. Palshikar
JUDGMENT

V.G. Palshikar, J.

1. By the Amending Act of 1999, the Parliament of India introduced extensive amendments to the Civil Procedure Code promulgated in 1908 and certain decisive and power curtailing amendments were made to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code which was earlier extensively amended in 1976. This amendment brought about by the Amending Act of 1999 was brought into force with effect from 1-7-2002.

2. After the application of the amending provisions from 1-7-2002 questions were raised in several Revision Applications either pending in this Court for admission or pending in this Court for final hearing as to whether the provisions of Section 115 as amended with effect from 1-7-2002 are applicable to proceedings pending as of that date or whether those proceedings are liable to be considered as if the amendment has not taken place in relation to the pending matters.

3. In view of the importance of the question involved and the repeated nature of it being raised before this Court, the matter was taken up for adjudication in Civil Revision Application No. 859/02 with the assistance of the learned members of the Bar. The matter was decided on 16-8-2002 and this Court has taken a view that the provisions of the amended Section 115 with effect from 1-7-2002 shall apply to pending proceedings also. That is to say, the pending proceedings and continuance thereof will have to be considered in the light of the provisions as amended with effect from 1-7-2002.

4. As a consequence to this ruling by this Court, an application is filed in Civil Revision Application No. 57/02 seeking conversion of the Revision Application under Section 115 to a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as powers under both the provisions of law are analogous in nature being superintending powers of this Court over the subordinate Courts and consequently such conversion is possible, permissible and should, therefore, be ordered. Again this being an important question of interpretation of powers of this Court, the matter was adjourned till today and the learned Members of the Bar were requested to address the Court on all the aspects of this question. I have heard the learned Counsel on the various facets of the question that is coming up for consideration.

5. This Court has to take into consideration the exercise of its jurisdiction or power of superintendence whether under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It has been submitted by Shri M.G. Bhangde, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants and several other Counsel that such conversion is possible. The submission put in nutshell as canvassed by all the learned Advocates is that the power either under Article 227 or under Section 115 being power of superintendence and this Court having held in Revision Application No. 859/02 that a right to apply under Section 115 of C.P.C. is no vested right of the litigant it being also the settled law of the country that right to move the High Court under Article 227 also is not a vested right, the right to move the Court for exercise of its power of superintendence is, therefore, a common right. That being the position, this Court is not powerless to order conversion.

6. Reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in Raghunath Gambhirshet .vs. Ganpat Motiram and others . There a Division Bench of this Court has held that powers conferred on a Tribunal or a Court are attached to the Tribunal or Court and a subsequent enlargement of jurisdiction of that Court cannot take away the power granted to it by the statute which created it and, therefore, this Court held that the power of revision conferred upon it under Section 7 is not limited to the exercise of the functions enumerated in Section 4 but that power attaches to the Tribunal irrespective of what jurisdiction can be conferred upon it from time to time by the Legislature. There is no question of the dicta of this judgment being in any manner doubted. It has been consistently laid down as law of the land and to similar effect is latest judgment in State of Orissa and others .vs. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, Cuttack and others . There also it was held that the power of review is conferred on a Court and it cannot be taken away either by abridgement of the jurisdiction or by enlargement of the jurisdiction. Again in Hari Shankar Jain .vs. Sonia Gandhi the Supreme Court reiterated this position in law and it was pointed out that the powers which are conferred on the High Court always remain with the High Court and cannot, therefore, be taken away. That being the situation, the submission is that powers under Article 227 can be exercised to avoid miscarriage of justice. The fact that Revision Applications have been admitted and are pending for the last several years demonstrates that there is a prima facie case existing and, therefore, interests of justice require conversion of the Revision Applications as petitions under Article

227.

7. Countering these submissions, it was submitted by Shri W.G. Charde, learned Counsel that to do so, namely, to permit conversion would be nullifying the effect of Legislature as intended by it. The learned Counsel submitted that by conscious exercise of its legislative powers the Parliament of India decided to curtail the powers of High Court of superintendence over the subordinate Courts by amending the provisions of Section 115 and by providing that only the finally decided revision applications would be saved. While dealing with this aspect, this Court has considered Section 97 of the Amending Act, 1976 and Section 32 of the Amending Act, 1999 and it is held that by necessary implication the amendment would apply to pending revisions also. That being the legal position today, is it possible or permissible for this Court to take a blanket resort under Article 227 and allow the provisions of the Amending Act and the provisions as amended to be squarely defeated by this Court. The argument of the learned Counsel in nutshell appears to be that, however plenary powers under Article 227 may be, user thereof for the purposes of defeating the Parliamentary intent would be impermissible in law. He, therefore, submitted that conversion in the circumstances is not possible. In any event, it should not be permitted.

8. I have to weigh these rival contentions in the light of the legal provisions that always existed and are today existing after the extensive amendments by the Amending Act of 1999. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure existed in that Code from 1908 and till 1950 when the Constitution of India was introduced, that was the only remedy to invoke the power of superintendence of this Court. It was only for the first time by introduction of the Constitution and by Article 227 thereof that supervisory jurisdiction apart from and in addition to Section 115 of C.P. Code was created. From 1950 onwards, therefore, two jurisdictions were existing in the High Court, one statutory jurisdiction conferred on it by Section 115 of the C.P. Code and another constitutional jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 227 of the Constitution. Both these powers have co-existed all these years. Section 115 was extensively amended in the year 1976. At that time also, Article 227 was in existence. It is today amended extensively and today also the power under Article 227 exists. It is obvious, therefore, that two remedies or two forums were available to the revision applicant under Section 115. He could knock the doors of this Court under Section 115 and complain of injustice caused to him within the framework of Section 115 or he could come to this Court, invoke or seek invoking of its powers under Article 227 which have no fetters and claim justice complaining of the injustice caused by the order impugned. When both the remedies were available, it was with conscious decision that the litigant has chosen to come before this Court for limited exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Having found that this Court has taken a view, right or wrong, under Section 115 the litigant cannot now turn round and say that Article 227 is also a power of superintendence with the Court, please exercise that. To permit a litigant to do so is to permit him to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The question as to whether this should be permitted or not is also to be seen from the provisions of Article 227 as also the provisions in judgments of the Supreme Court in this regard.

9. Way back in 1954, the Supreme Court has observed as under :-

“The power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.”
The powers under Article 227, therefore, are to be sparingly used. This authority has been consistently followed by the Supreme Court of India.

10. In Estralla Rubber .vs. Dass Estate (P.) Ltd. , the Supreme Court has observed while commenting upon the scope and ambit of Article 227 that the Article does not confer an unlimited prerogative upon the High Court to correct all wrong decisions or to prevent hardships caused thereby. It is then observed by the Supreme Court of India that the power under Article 227 can be exercised to interfere with orders of the lower Courts and Tribunals only in cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. As pointed out above, in as many as 29 Revision Applications, oral request has been made for conversion of the Revision Application into a Writ Petition. To permit such blanket conversion is to brand all orders passed within jurisdiction as ones in serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law. It may not be possible to go to that extent for exercise of power under Article 227.

11. In the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Ouseph Mathai and others .vs. M. Abdul Khadir , the Supreme Court of India has observed about Article 227. It lays down categorically that a petitioner cannot invoke jurisdiction under Article 227 as a matter of right. Petition under Article 227, Supreme Court held, cannot be treated like an extension of a statutory appeal or revision. If a Writ Petition under Article 227 by the dicta of the Supreme Court cannot be treated like an extension of revision, to seek conversion of that revision into a petition would be ignorance of the dicta of Supreme Court and Article 141 of the Constitution of India does not permit this Court to do so. Then it has been observed in this decision while speaking about the scope of Article 227 that mere wrong decision is not a ground for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. The High Court may intervene under Article 227 only where it is established that lower Court or Tribunal has been guilty of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power. Where a statutory right of revision is provided and is exercised, it is exercised to point out infraction of law whether minor or major. It invites exercise of an important jurisdiction within the limits in which it is conferred on a particular Court or a Tribunal. To read dereliction of duty in every such order only to clothe this Court with a jurisdiction under Article 227 is not permissible.

12. In State of Himachal Pradesh .vs. Raja Mahendra Pal and others the Supreme Court of India was considering the question of exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 for protection of alleged fundamental rights. By the original Writ Petition filed before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the petitioner Raja Mahendra Pal prayed for certain writs on the allegations that certain rights contractual in nature had by reason of the nature of those contracts acquired the status of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and, therefore, the writ should be entertained. The Writ Petition was allowed by the High Court and the matter was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court of India. An objection was taken before the Supreme Court to the maintainability of the Writ Petition and it was contended that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the same and granting relief as alternative remedy of filing a suit either for recovery of money or rendition of accounts was available. There, the Supreme Court of India thus observed while dealing with the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 :-

“……It is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature which can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right but not for mere contractual rights arising out of an agreement particularly in view of the existence of efficacious alternative remedy. The Constitutional Court should insist upon the party to avail of the same instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court.”
In view of this mandate of the Supreme Court that the Constitutional Court should insist upon the party to avail the same instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction, to say sitting in jurisdiction under Section 115 of C.P. Code that we will exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 en masse and treat all the revisions applications as petitions under that Article will be against the dicta of the Supreme Court. Take into consideration that today a petition is pending in this Court praying for exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 in a case where the order is revisable by the provisions of Section 115 as it stands today, following the dicta of Supreme Court cited above, this Court will raise a query as to whether the jurisdiction under Article 227 should be exercised or not in view of the existence of an alternative remedy. That being the position in law, to require conversion of 29 revision applications en masse into a petition under Article 229 would be against the dicta of the Supreme Court as cited above.

13. In this very case, the Supreme Court goes on to observe as under :-

“This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to a citizen under peculiar and special facts notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of the special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said Article. In the instant case, the High Court did not notice any special circumstance which could be held to have persuaded it to deviate from the settled proposition of law regarding the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
Then the Supreme Court observes :

“For exercise of writ jurisdiction the High Court pressed into service the alleged fundamental right to livelihood of the respondent which was found to have been violated by not making him the payment of the amounts claimed in the writ petition. It is true that Article 21 of the Constitution is of utmost importance, violation of which, as and when found, directly or indirectly, or even remotely, has to be looked with disfavour.”
The Supreme Court then observed :

“The High Court appears to have adopted a very generous, general and casual approach in applying the right to livelihood to the facts and circumstances of the case apparently for the purpose of clothing itself with the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are sure that if the High Court had considered the argument in the right perspective and in the light of various pronouncements of this Court, it would not have ventured to assume jurisdiction for the purposes of conferring the State largess of public money, upon an unscrupulous litigant …..”
The Supreme Court had again, therefore, to lay down in most unequivocal terms the manner in which the jurisdiction has to be exercised by this Court. In the face of this ruling, to say or pray that all revision applications wherever pending be converted into writ petitions under Article 227 because that also is a power of superintendence is to require casual approach to the provisions of Article 227 which the Supreme Court has looked with disfavour in the above cited judgment.

14. There is yet another aspect which has to be taken into consideration while dealing with point and that is the question of using extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court conferred on it by Article 227 for defeating the intention of Legislature as evidenced by the provisions of the Amending Act of 1999. The Parliament has consciously legislated and has curbed the jurisdiction of this Court by laying down certain more restrictions by the amendment effective from 1-7-2002. To convert these revision applications into writ petitions or permit their conversion for such purpose is to use the powers under Article 227 to circumvent the amendment as made by the Parliament of India. Such exercise of power by this Court would be to say the least an abuse of its own power.

15. In yet another judgment in Koyilerian Janaki and others .vs. Rent Controller (Munsiff), Cannanore and others considering the question of exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution, it was observed by the Supreme Court that while interpreting a statute or while laying down any rule of law, the consideration of that provision should be purposeful. The Supreme Court went on to observe that where a statute does not provide any second appeal or revision to the High Court, the purpose is to give finality to the order passed under the statute and in that situation, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with such an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. The Supreme Court observed thus in paragraph no.4 :

“4.Further we are in agreement with the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that it was not appropriate for the High Court to have interfered with the order passed by the District Judge in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The proceedings in the present case arose under a special Act governing the landlord and tenant relationship and disputes. The Act does not provide any second appeal or revision to the High Court. The purpose behind for not providing such remedy is to give finality to the order passed under the Act. The power under Article 227 is exercisable where it is found by the High Court that due to a certain grave error an injustice has been caused to a party. For this reason also, the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.”
16. It is true that I am not deciding a Writ Petition under Article 227 or its scope. I am also not deciding the question as to whether in a given situation the powers under Article 227 can be exercised to correct an illegal order made by subordinate Court. That question can be squarely considered in a lis brought before this Court under Article 227. I am only concerned with the question as to whether a conversion from a revision application to a writ petition is possible or permissible. To decide this question, it is, therefore, necessary that the scope and extent of both the Article 227 and Section 115 are looked into.

17. There is yet another judgment of Supreme Court cited at the Bar by Shri Sadavarte, Advocate in Shama Prashant Raje .vs. Ganpatrao and others reported in 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 206 throwing some light on the scope and jurisdiction of the Courts under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution. It is observed by the Supreme Court of India that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court is supervisory and not appellate and consequently, Article 226 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken. Following the ratio, it is, therefore, obvious that Article 227 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert a revision into a writ petition.

18. Yet another judgment is cited at the Bar rendered by the Supreme Court of India in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another .vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi deceased through his heirs and L.Rs. reported in 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 507. There the Supreme Court has observed that the second appeal or revision having not been provided to High Court from decision of the appellate Court so as to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority, the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. In this decision, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph no. 9 as under :-

“9.Before parting with this judgment we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The Act is a special legislation governing landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. The Legislature has, in its wisdom, not provided second appealor revision to the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.”
To permit in the face of this decision conversion of a civil revision application which is liable to be rejected by a reason of application of Section 115 into a writ petition is to nullify the legislative intent of not providing wide revisionary powers to the High Court. It must be seen and noted that by the amendment of July, 2002, clause (b) of the proviso to Section 115 as it existed has been deleted. The consequences of deletion are made clear. A power which was hitherto before available to the High Court has been by positive legislation curtailed by the Parliament. To use the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 to circumvent this legislative intent would, as I have already observed above, be an abuse of the process of law. To use a rule of law as an abuse of the process of law would be the biggest abuse of the process of law. A Court of law cannot in the circumstances be invited to abuse the law. A rule of law has been laid down that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court shall be this much and not any more. This intent of the Legislature must be respected as a rule of law. To require conversion en masse of revision applications into writ petitions to circumvent this provision would be impermissible in law.

19. There is yet another decision of the Supreme Court which is required to be noted. It is Sugarbai M. Siddiq and others vs. Ramesh S. Hankare (dead) by L.Rs.

wherein the Supreme Court has thus observed while dealing with the scope of Article 227 that the High Court is concerned not with the decision of the lower Court or Tribunal but with its decision making process.

“Held:
In an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to see whether the lower court/tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether the impugned order is vitiated by procedural irregularity; in other words, the Court is concerned not with the decision but with the decision-making process. On this ground alone the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside.”
According to the Supreme Court, therefore, the scope of Article 227 is to see whether the authority whose decision is complained of had the jurisdiction or not in all these revision applications. Admittedly, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction and the complaint is that the jurisdiction is either wrongly exercised or illegally exercised. The exercise of jurisdiction is not in question. That being the position, the revision application complaining of an order which is made within jurisdiction cannot be converted into a petition complaining of jurisdiction. For this reason, in my opinion, such conversion cannot be granted.

20. Reliance was placed on a judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Santosh Kanwar and others .vs. Surgyan Kanwar and others reported in AIR 2002 RAJASTHAN 152 where the learned Single Judge considered the question of conversion of an application under Section 115 of the C.P.C. into a writ petition under Article 227 even without application. Relying on this, it was submitted at the Bar that such course being permissible conversion should be allowed in this case also. It was pointed out by the learned Counsel that the judgment in the case of Vishesh Kumar vs. Shanti Prasad on which reliance has been placed to say conversion is not possible was considered again by the Supreme Court. It was observed that the dicta of was confined to the facts of that case. I have no manner of doubt in observing that this Court does have the power in a given rare case to exercise the powers under Article 227 and take up a matter for revision which is prohibited under Section 115 but that occasion as has been observed by the Supreme Court in several judgments quoted above is extremely rare. If and when it arises, this Court can exercise the jurisdiction and convert a given application. A given Writ Petition under Article 227 may also be converted into a revision under Section 115 but what can be done in an isolated case in peculiar facts and circumstances of a case should not be adopted as a regular course for defeating the intent of the Legislature.

21. In yet another decision in Mohd. Yunus .vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and others while speaking about scope and extent of Article 227 the Supreme Court observed thus :

“A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority”, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, muchless an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”
There the Supreme Court held that where a second appeal or revision lay to the High Court against an order of the subordinate court, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of subordinate court under Article 227 of the Constitution, the reasoning being that if the High Court can be approached in a particular jurisdiction, exercise of that jurisdiction by the High Court is only warranted. Using that as an opening, the High Court cannot use powers under some other source and interfere with the order. The intention of Legislature in cutting the revisional extent is obvious. Even today revision is maintainable in the High Court as per the provisions of Section 115 as amended. Even now, it is open for the litigant to go under that limited jurisdiction as now made by Section 115 of C.P.C. or approach under Article 227 for exercise of that superintending power. If so approached, whether that power should be exercised or not in that particular case is not what is being decided by me today. That is a question which can squarely be raised and decided in appropriate proceedings.

22. In effect, the submission made on behalf of the applicants is that the Court should assume jurisdiction under Article 227 to do justice in a case where the High Court was moved under Section 115 of the C.P.Code is not acceptable.

23. It is obvious that both the revisional jurisdiction and the power of superintendence though are similar are not identical. One is a statutory remedy provided by the Code, the other is a constitutional right of the Court to be exercised. It will be worth noting the observations of the noted Jurist late Shri H.M. Seervai commenting upon assumption of jurisdiction by Courts in his book Constitutional Law of India”. While commenting upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India, he has to observe :

“The amazing conclusion drawn by K.N. Singh J. from the two aforesaid judgments is best set out in his own words. He said :
“There is, therefore, no room for any doubt that this Court has wide power to interfere and correct the judgment and orders passed by any Court or Tribunal in the country. In addition to the appellate power, the Court has special residuary power to entertain appeal against any order of any Court in the country. The plenary jurisdiction of this Court to grant leave and hear appeals against any order of a Court or Tribunal confers power of judicial superintendence over all the Courts and Tribunals in the territory of India including subordinate Courts of Magistrate and District Judge. This Court has, therefore, supervisory jurisdiction over all Courts in India.”
It is submitted first, that the conclusion drawn by K.N. Singh, J. is a non sequitur, because the possession of plenary appellate powers does not, and cannot, include a power of judicial superintendence which is a distinct and separate power. Secondly, it can be shown affirmatively, that the Sup. Ct. possesses no power of judicial superintendence over all courts and tribunals, including subordinate courts, because that power is expressly conferred on the High Courts alone.”

Late Shri Seervai has thus in unequivocal terms condemned assumption of jurisdiction by Courts. Then the learned author makes reference to the Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another .It is, therefore, undoubtedly true that this Court has a wide jurisdiction under Article 227 but the question is of wisdom in exercising that jurisdiction or the question is of using that jurisdiction to circumvent a legal provision duly legislated by the supreme Legislature of India.

24. Viewed from any point, therefore, it is not possible for me to accede to the request that Revision Application filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code can be converted into a Writ Petition. After operation of the amended Section 115, revision application must end. Proceedings must terminate as the petition is not maintainable. To entertain a not maintainable petition and say on it that it should be transposed as a writ petition to get the jurisdiction in order to nullify the legislative intent is such a course which the Supreme Court has positively disapproved in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh .vs. Raja Mahendra Pal, cited supra. When both the jurisdictions are co-existing and are available to the litigants, to say or to permit a litigant after six years of pendency or for that matter six days of pendency of an application which by operation of law is not maintainable, be permitted to be made a petition under Article 227 would be setting at naught the legislative mandates. Such exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, in my opinion, is not permissible.

25. I have already made it clear and I repeat that all observations made by me in relation to the interpretation of Section 115 and Article 227 are made pertaining to the prayer for conversion of revisions en masse into petitions and the authority of this Court to direct such conversion with reference to the provisions of Article 227. I have come to the conclusion that such conversion is neither permissible nor possible. These observations should not, therefore, be construed as making any inroads on the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227, the aspect of which can be independently considered. In the view that I have taken I make the following order :-

(i)The request of conversion of these 29 revision applications into writ petitions under Article 227 is rejected, as such conversion is not permissible in law.
(ii) The request by Shri Khapre in this revision application for permission to withdraw the revision application is granted. However, his prayer for continuing the interim order for four weeks is rejected.
(iii) All these revision applications in which permission was sought for conversion are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed as not maintainable being petitions or applications challenging an order which is interlocutory in nature.
In the circumstances, there will be no order as to the costs.